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SDA: An Historical Reflection With Preliminary Observations
In  t h e  B e g in n in g
SDA's pre history in Mozambique goes back to the first SAP. This opens with the unusual - 
for a SAP at any time let alone then - statement that the primary economic problem in 
Mozambique is the weakness o f  (effective) demand. The W orld Bank probably thought this 
absurd (the IMF surely did - and does!) but accepted it as not binding and because Abdul 
Magid Osman insisted on it. What did (presumably does) it mean to him?
Quite simply that the viable (physically and locationally despite the war) portions o f  the 
Mozambican economy were operating far below capacity and were therefore unable to carry 
out maintenance or to  invest because there was not enough effective demand. Imbalance 
could only be reduced if  production and household (both wage-earner and rural incomes) 
could be raised. In the absence o f  such action, either shutdown or uncompetitive prices (and 
uncontrollable smuggling) would result and create a vicious circle. This reading (with which I 
concur) in no way denied there was also a supply problem, especially as to forex and fiscal 
receipts, but doubted it could be closed prior to rehabilitation o f  incomes and reconstruction 
o f  infrastructure after the end o f the war and certainly not without enhanced production and 
increased effective domestic demand.
Because the production (and real wage) increases could not be achieved overnight and 
because w ar had created a massive physical food shortage (as well as a household one related 
to inadequate income) a parallel line o f  action was Emergencia (rural household survival 
focused on deslocados totally out o f  production) and - later - GAPVU (and its stillborn 
intended government wage parallel) for urban residents unable to eat even minimally 
adequately without subventions.
The main source o f  the increased demand was seen as earned income by poor households.
That meant focusing on enabling farmers to produce/sell more. That was the justification for 
transport subsidies from areas able to  produce, but facing prohibitive transport costs and -
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much less coherently - on expanding small enterprises (e.g. via the fund for small businesses to 
expand wage employment by financing complementary fixed capital expansion somewhat 
oddly smuggled into the World Bank's Urban Rehabilitation Project after vehement criticism 
that it was too capital intensive and employment non-creating) plus tw o other institutes 
relating to  small scale and micro business facilitation, training and - very exiguously - finance.
This was a perfectly coherent and rationally argued strategy which the Bank respected even if 
it doubted its viability and certainly believed had no adequate data or policy articulation basis.
In parallel SDA as a Bank global (or at any rate SSA) agenda item had been bom  out o f three 
interacting factors:
a. the creation o f  PAMSCAD (Programme to Ameliorate the Social Consequences o f  
Adjustment) in 1985-87. PAM SCAD was the brainchild o f  Ghana's Economic Advisor to 
the President and Prime M inister using substantial insights, personnel, advice and 
preliminary drafting support from UNICEF particularly the then Country Representative 
and a special consultant sent by the then Deputy Managing D irector - as it happens the 
consultant was RHG which was to  influence SDA albeit Children On The Frontline and 
the 1986-87 M artin/Green review o f  economic/security interaction for the Prime Minister 
w ere the basis for RHG's subsequent selection for work in M ozambique first with Finance 
(1988 including preventing Tete famine and advising on launch o f  GAPVU), Health (the 
1988-89 Poverty Study) and Planning (1989-91 UNICEF and subsequently ODA via Bank 
on creation and operation o f  SDA);
b. UNICEF had made a high profile attack on immiserisation caused by SAPs - later 
reworked to be an attack on SAPs failure to  combat absolute poverty, however caused, 
and to restore basic services (primary health, education, water - and in UNICEF and 
Mozambique perspective, though much less so generally, sanitation). This shift (after a 
running intrangency dialogue in which RHG took the increasing absolute poverty/decline 
in basic service access however caused position as, i) much easier to  demonstrate; ii) 
much easier both to  justify morally and - in most cases - to programme; iii) less likely to 
provoke violent Bank hostility since to argue something vital has been left out is easier to 
respond to positively than a claim you are killing people as a direct result o f  your actions) 
combined with UNICEF's intellectual/moral weight convinced the Bank it had to respond 
positively;
c. Kim Jaycox had always believed "Structural adjustment programmes which rend the fabric 
o f  society cannot be sustained" (1986) and in fact believed both that such programmes 
w ere in any case bad economics and worse morality and that any SAP should stabilise and
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restore overall GDP growth to create a base for economic and social transformation and 
development.
And so SDA was created as a Bank unit. It has always suffered from being reactive (not 
strategically planned within the Bank despite the 1990 World Development Report in Poverty 
and the 1991/2 Poverty Guidelines and priority order) and from rapid turnover o f  not 
particularly high powered (or influential) staff. In addition - especially early on - it suffered 
from:
a. a surfeit o f  elaborate data collection proposals (everybody in the Bank who w anted data 
latched on to SDA leading in one case to a 60 plus page questionnaire starting w ith name, 
address and - astoundingly - nearest police station) the first o f  which took 4 years and cost 
about $10 per capita;
b. a belief poverty alleviation was an 'add on' to be compartmentalised in special parallel 
programmes under a special Treasury unit outside the main stream ministries (a m arked 
shift in Bank approved PAM SCAD from Health-Education-Community D evelopm ent - 
Women's Council proposals Ghana put up and one which in practice delayed and limited 
implementation especially in respect to production by poor people);
c. an emphasis on public sector "redeployees" not because they were necessarily very poor 
(or because plausible retraining as entrepreneurs or for reintegration into small farming 
existed or w ere devised) but primarily to "buy o ff ' opposition;
d. and a tendency if  a country clearly did not want that mix to accept anything halfway 
poverty related it put up (e.g. a Tanzanian package o f  non-pharmaceutical health inputs, 
w ater system maintenance materials, inputs into textbook printing and school furniture 
making) which - while micro useful - hardly constituted a strategic initiative (beyond in the 
case cited seeking to limit erosion o f  basic service provision),
Therefore - not surprisingly - in Mozambique the Bank proposed and (except for the 
Coordinator who was funded by UNICEF when he refused to sign a contract calling for pre 
delivery to GOM  vetting/editing o f  text by the Bank) funded the 1987-89 Poverty Study.
P o v e r t y  St u d y  T o  SDA P r o j e c t
The Poverty Study was carried out at basic data collection, preliminary analysis, and 
discussion o f  drafts level by senior Mozambican officials (most o f  National D irector level). 
They were paid by the Bank as consultants at a lump sum rate more or less equal to  their
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GOM  salaries (excluding fringe benefits). The diligence was high, the quality o f  results 
uneven.
The taking o f  directions from the Inter-ministerial Commission Chairman (Dr. Igreja-Campos, 
who was chosen as a person as much as because he was Vice Minister o f  Health) and the 
M inister o f  Finance, the filling o f  data gaps, the conceptualisation o f  a - necessarily - fairly 
rigorous but largely qualitative and order o f  magnitude approach and the drafting o f  the 
Poverty Report was done by the Coordinator (RHG). There was supposed to  be a 
Mozambican feedback and then a revision, but the first never happened so the 1989 final 
version was the Co-ordinator's product on added data and editorial smoothing.
The "ownership" issue arose. There was substantial suspicion in some quarters (not the 
Chairman, the Minister o f  Finance or UNICEF, nor I presume the Prime Minister) that the 
Bank controlled the Coordinator. On the whole after a heated dialogue with a proponent o f  
that thesis in a meeting o f  officials the majority accepted that the Coordinator clearly did view 
himself as a temporary Mozambican Civil Servant responsible to  and acting on directives o f  
Chairman, MF and - in one case - a Conselho dos Ministros terms o f  reference directive.
By 1989 three factors created a context in which some kind o f  SDA project had to  go to the 
next Congroup meeting:
a. several donors (Nordic, Netherlands, Canada but also UK - who liked PAM SCAD - and 
Germany) wanted action to alleviate poverty especially among "informal sector" members;
b. the Bank - which thought the Poverty Study to be well done and convincing - wanted to 
head off $20-50 million donor reallocation o f  funding to "basic needs "/poverty alleviation 
which it believed could not be spent on articulated, viable programmes/projects;
c. the Minister o f  Finance (backed by PM  and Health and, in less detail, President) wanted to  
create Mozambican capacity to  collect data and analyse it (the reason DNE Household 
Survey by UNDP had been given high priority) and to conceptualise and articulate a policy 
reduction/basic services and infrastructure rehabilitation strategy from it for integration 
into all expenditure programmes and Ministries. He saw this as contributing to 
rehabilitating CNP and envisaged it as also strengthening Ministerial Planning Units. The 
intent was always to create a Mozambican capacity and to build up Mozambican 
professional expertise as rapidly as practicable. The key outside input from his perspective 
was selected technical assistance personnel on, a) concept and strategy, b) checking out 
articulation including Provincial/District and c) incorporating poverty reduction criteria 
into (ongoing) Capital Budgeting rolling three year planning (i.e. SSPA, SPA, PAA).
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The need to get a proposal in place before Congroup - to head o ff a donor revolt for the 
Bank; to get inputs for capacity building for M inister o f  Finance and Chairman - explains 
otherwise odd incorporation as a protocol/amendment in an already negotiated contract. The 
different reasons for SDA explain:
i. obscurity o f  expatriate role (self contained unit with expat head de facto  reporting to  W B- 
M aputo and W ashington Bank optimum and reporting to Chairman via DNP via a 
Mozambican professional head o f project Mozambican optimum);
ii. inclusion o f  a Household Survey de facto  duplicating ongoing UNDP one (which Bank 
wanted dropped, whereas Mozambique never considered doing so);
iii. the relatively unrelated SAF to please bilaterals (especially DTZ, ODA, N etherlands, 
Switzerland) but not coherently thought out by Bank nor Mozambique who did not see it 
as among their priorities.
Clearly these factors were to  create subsequent problems. First and foremost, SDA did not 
really come into operation until late 1991 and up to  1992 UNICEF financed stopgap role o f  
SSPA with other tw o PA posts vacant. Second, while the dropping o f  Bank/keeping o f  
UNDP for Household Survey was agreed by Bank it led them to suppose involvement in the 
DNE (in fact self contained UNDP until 1994) team and use o f  its data was som ehow 'outside' 
SDA which w as not how DNP or SDA saw it. Third, while Mozambique w on on each 
expatriate reporting to a Mozambican, the three way accountability envisaged collapsed back 
to all three reporting to DNP's National D irector (nominally - tw o in fact as D TZ person 
seemingly reported primarily to DTZ). However, the basic gap was the lack - until 1994 - o f  a 
M ozambican head o f  unit (or indeed o f  a unit since SDA was a project whereas U A P is an 
integral, permanent part o f  DNP structure). This related partly to  scarcity o f  personnel and 
partly to a debacle. The then National D irector wanted to move to  be head o f  project, but 
rather too  clearly in large part to earn $40,000 a year. The overtness o f  this and problem s o f 
new D irector/form er Director now project head relations - plus DTZ and Bank reservations to 
funding M ozambican professionals in the public service at quasi expatriate salary levels - killed 
not only that appointment but any full time Mozambican project head appointm ent out o f  
project funds. By 'accident' a senior professional (Sergio Cassamo) was appointed Admin 
Head (on a demi international salary) which was useful for the SSPA's talking through issues 
and for communication as he continued to  be a senior advisor to  the PM, but this w as not a 
formal part o f  project structure (and the tw o other expatriates did not make much use o f  
opportunities it presented). Fourth, the SAF problem is discussed below but basically the 
ND/DNP and SSPA wished to devote only strategic and fleeting attention, the SPA (none too 
happily) ran it with some input from Project Advisor but in a rather intrusive/do the proposals 
way (which may have been inevitable) and with no clear ideas as to  overall goals, scope or
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feedback beyond getting funds spent on halfway plausible projects to keep donors and Bank 
happy (or as lags built up, at least to get them off ND/DNP's back).
M o z a m b ic a n  O w n e r s h ip , D ir e c t io n , R e c o r d s  a n d  P e r s o n n e l
SDA was Mozambican owned from the start with the probable exception o f  SAF and the clear 
one o f  the DTZ provided Project Advisor. This became increasingly clear over time. It 
created little friction - the Bank was not very clear what it wanted done and did value the 
analytical, conceptual, strategic work, e.g. its Poverty Policy Framework Paper (1992-93) for 
Mozambique is - except for proposals - largely rehashed from SDA memos and even action 
proposals include a number o f  SDA's. The SSPA was determined neither to  be, nor to  be seen 
to  be, the Bank's or ODA's property. The PA was perfectly prepared to take direction from 
N D/DNP and while much closer to  Bank and to ODA did not take (nor in general receive) 
orders from them.
The reason some doubts persisted was the absence o f  Mozambican professionals. Here the 
SSPA initially sought their recruitment but was told it was not feasible and (perhaps in 
retrospect too readily) turned to taking direction from ND and Vice Minister (and de facto  in 
some respects from Sergio) and slotting output to  whichever Mozambican professionals 
(primarily but not only in NDP) seemed likely to be able to use it in ongoing programmes - 
e.g. Household Budget Survey, Land Policy, Decentralisation/Regional Planning, GAPVU, 
Famine Limitation
The direction was somewhat exiguous as neither ND nor VM (nor even Sergio) had time to  
allow frequent briefings. The pattern was often an initial discussion o f desired outputs for a 
session and a closing report on what had been done (with memos turned in as produced). This 
was a result o f  the Mozambicans' time constraints - the SSPA's background was in the 
Tanzanian Ministry o f  Finance where as Economic Advisor (full, or later part time) he had 
reported regularly to Minister, Chief National Director, National Directors and been able to 
see them within 24-36 hours on a "need to  consult" basis.
Virtually all o f  the memos produced (mimeoed or hand printed) by SSPA were in response to  
specific requests or endorsements o f  suggested topics. Topics he suggested which received 
no (or negative) interest were dropped. Some items may look academic - e.g. the three on 
land - but were in a very real policy dialogue context (note that one was translated and used at 
high level national seminar).
Part o f  the problem is that Project Advisor wrote no reports and SPA rather few beyond trip 
reports and relatively descriptive activity summaries. However, a major and more general
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problem is the near total absence o f  a DNP filing system. At best, each officer holds materials 
deemed relevant. With high turnover and low handover briefing, this is highly dam aging to  
creation o f  a DNP wide data base or an historical memory.
Linked to  this - at least until 1994 - was the fact that only SSPA (precisely because he w as not 
present all the time) could devote substantial time to medium term conceptualisation, strategy, 
policy articulation and structural policy/programme review. On the whole the N D s and VM  
valued that input and did not seek to involve him in day to day crisis management. The one 
major exception - the 1991/92 drought, 1992/93 exacerbated food supply crisis w as strategic 
as the 1,000,000 deaths which at one time seemed potentially possible would have had long 
term economic, social and political structural consequences.
Finally, none o f  the three expatriates (nor Sergio) appears to have w ritten a final 
reflection/evaluation/suggestion report. I f  the SSPA had made the final trip envisaged for 
mid-1995, he would have done so - on prior visits he saw no priority to  interim apologia pro 
via sua papers. This paper may in part fill that gap.
O u t r e a c h : S o u r c e s , D is s e m in a t io n , T r a in in g
SDA was in practice relatively enclavised albeit less so than might be supposed from  the 
extant records. It did relate to several major DNP and one DNE program m es and did 
influence national strategy and programming via ND, VM and until their departure, M inister 
Osman and Vice Minister Igreja Campos.
It had few close or formal links to donors or foreign NGOs - deliberately to  avoid doubts as to 
ownership. The SSPA saw the World Bank and - especially - UNICEF regularly, U ND P 
somewhat less so, several donors at unofficial UNICEF hosted issue seminars and one or tw o 
more (not including ODA) via personal contacts. The SPA had W orld Bank, U SA ID  and 
ODA contacts. The SSPA was always willing to  see donors or N GO s if  they sought him and 
did have - somewhat unsystematic - NGO contacts (including ActionAid via its UK  office, 
Oxfam at both ends and SCF in Maputo).
SDA was in part an effort to  rebuild Mozambican capacity and viewed a surfeit o f  external 
NGOs as part o f  the problem not part o f  the answer. Mozambican bodies on the N orthern 
NGO model w ere few and weak, needing to  pay their members if  they w ere to  devote time, 
and o f  limited experience/professional capacity. The main social sector organisations were 
some co-ops and women's groups and the main churches. The SPA sought to  build up 
contacts with their former. Until 1993-94 it was not clear there was a governm ent policy o f  
favouring broad basic service (or even poverty alleviation) delivery capacity by the latter. The
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SSPA had used his personal capacity as a practising Anglican to build up contact with the 
street children work at St. Stephen and St. Lawrence Church and - on a broader discussion 
front - with Bishop Dinis Singulane. Once the policy shift was clear, he advocated SAF's 
redirection (as one major priority) to  co-funding education, health and related social sector 
work o f churches (and if possible mosques). SPA in principle agreed and had some contact 
with congregational level Catholic work but did not seek to  conceptualise or articulate the 
approach.
Input collection was not very coherent - partly because DNP's lack o f  files was typical and 
partly because all government senior personnel were overloaded. There was substantial 
contact - often informal - in M aputo and, in the case o f  SPA, on field trips.
Presentation of/to national seminars was weak. There was one early SDA run one - linked to 
the Poverty Report - but (so far as I know) no more actually happened albeit several were 
proposed. Presumably either there was no one to take charge o f  setting up or there were 
problems in securing Ministry commitments to attend.
Training was never thought through in a systematic way. Initially it was envisaged that new 
Mozambican professionals after a year in post would go abroad for a year's training. As there 
w ere no such persons, the problems o f  where for what courses never arose. Domestic course 
training o f people in other M inistries (or even DNA) would have required SDA professional 
time which was simply not available. Training abroad o f  staff o f  other Ministries was not self- 
evidently logically a priority for SDA funding, faced a problem o f where/what courses and 
above all would have pulled out badly needed personnel with nobody to fill the gap. (It is 
w orth noting that D NP over 5 years o f  invitations was never able to  free anyone for IDS 
(Sussex) three week Structural Adjustment to Transformation Seminars. Granted this was not 
an SDA component but it was a relevant course - which benefited from SDA experience via 
SSPA - and would have been - still could be - available at no cost to Mozambique).
Why little was written up and produced in a form for dissemination (and that little almost all 
by SSPA at IDS and - because o f  lack o f  directions - often under the IDS label) is unclear. 
W ord processing and reproduction capacity existed and - presumably - translation could have 
been bought in. Possibly the ND  never had time to reflect on a programme? And/or the SPA 
was so busy on work within DNP as to have the same crowding out by not considering result?
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SAF: T h e  P o o r  R e l a t i o n
The priority and personnel relationships which militated against SAF effectiveness and for
hustling through any halfway sound project to keep donors satisfied have been mentioned.
Several other factors made matters even less satisfactory:
a. o f  the initial two large - semi pilot - projects (rural medical aids and M aputo canisa 
standpipes) the first was so much delayed the Swiss financed bilaterally outside SAF while 
the second was delayed for four years from design by constant rehashing and proposals to  
double budget to include an extended expatriate consultant on poor w ater user 
perceptions, desires and favoured forms o f  structuring and payment so that W ater clearly 
wished it had never heard o f  SAF but gone to  the Netherlands direct. These tw o items (up 
to  $2 to  $2.5 million) would if  begun in 1990 as envisaged in 1989 have given SAF a 
credibility base with donors and provided time to  think out what could usefully be done on 
the pilot/test project front;
b. DTZ de facto  ran a separate programme only nominally under SAF and explicitly 
unconcerned with whether SDA personnel (other than DTZ's Project Advisor) plus N D  
and donor review committee approved or not. What its criteria were was by no means 
clear;
c. guidelines on data needed to  provide feedback on how pilots operated and w hat revisions 
would strengthen/allow generalisation in future were not set until 1994 at earliest. (SSPA  
advocated in 1990 and assumed done until 1994.) Instead financial propriety based on 
receipts was used as report back frame which robbed SAF o f learning feedback content;
d. domestic civil society and small government unit bodies rarely knew o f  SAF o r - a fortiori 
- how to  apply. As a result SPA built up an assistance for applications capacity in-house 
using SDA plus consultants;
e. external actors pushed one or more appalling projects (e.g. bicycles - rejected w ith great 
difficulty as Bank backed it and livelihood - approved and failed) via domestic bodies 
which took de facto  sponsors' technical analysis and socio economic data evaluation on 
faith and in tw o cases foreign NGOs received SAF grants to supplement their external 
government funding (apparently to get disbursement rate up - or so Project Advisor, SPA 
indicated).
In 1993-94 the SSPA (rather late in the day) attempted to  reconceptualise SAF:
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a. focus on co-financing Mozambican social sector and local government projects with a 
view to building a base for their complementing and entering into 'joint ventures' with 
Ministries;
b. basing reporting and monitoring on using the projects to evolve ways to operate non-main 
ministry, innovative, decentralised projects;
c. making potential bidders aware SAF existed and providing advice (short o f  ventriloquising 
submissions) to  them;
d. shifting as much o f  SAF operations as possible to SEAS with at most a funding, plus a 
strategic guideline setting and review role left to  SDA which was not and should not seek 
to become a line operational body - i.e. to render SAF a social sector, service provider 
complementing GAPVU's household role but more focused on design and structure testing 
with generalised finance to come via sectoral ministry budgets (e.g. Ministries pay citizen 
personnel salaries in church linked schools, "sanitary" districts [clinics], rural hospitals).
SEAS - which SDA had earlier advised (apparently with limited impact) to focus on 
assisting/empowering local government and social sector service delivery rather than on 'own 
operations' - had begun to  shift to a similar approach. The citizen professionals in UAP - 
independent o f  SSPA - took a very strong position in transferring SAF totally to  SEAS and 
doing no more than strategic monitoring/review (as with GAPVU) and were favourably 
disposed to focusing on new, small, decentralised priorities.
Monitoring appears to have been very weak. That, perhaps, was inevitable given financial 
propriety/receipts core o f  reports required plus limited staff time. W hat was reviewed was 
disquieting. W ater (perhaps because by time SAF funds came original project designers w ere 
gone and no successor was much interested) did not - as provided for in agreement and as it 
had done on at least some prior canisa projects - set up user committees to discuss location 
(basically though not entirely public relations as location o f  main pipelines and o f  barrio 
population virtually mandates locations o f  feeder lines and fontenarias) plus faucet height nor 
shape and design o f  concrete base to  allow multiple hygienic use (e.g. drinking w ater supply 
plus washing plus livestock watering). N or did the user committees to manage and (with 
W ater supplied training ) to do routine maintenance plus reporting breakdowns beyond their 
capacity to rectify to  W ater - as well as to collect fees equal to operating costs, maintenance 
and a portion o f  overheads negotiated W ater/Committee as to how much the latter was to 
raise and Committee/User on what form the charges would take and who would be exempted 
on absolute poverty grounds ever come into operation. The failure is now a recorded fact, but 
the important question remains "Why?" That needs to  be answered to reduce risk o f  
repetition.
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SDA's primary goal - from a GOM  perspective - was to create a mainstream GOM  ability to 
analyse poverty with an institutional/personnel capacity to conceptualise from that analysis for 
incorporation in strategy, policy articulation, programming and monitoring/review. 
(M ainstream in the sense that CNP/DNP would include the specialist personnel serving DNP 
and other Mozambican programme operators by analysis-design-review and that normal 
operational government and social sector bodies would build poverty reduction into ongoing 
planning and programming.)
That goal - as the outside evaluation consultant (who quite incisively identifies it) rather 
bewilderedly agrees - was largely met. As o f  1995 GOM strategy and policy was to  a 
substantial degree (much more than in most o f  SSA) informed by poverty reduction concerns 
incorporated on the basis o f  a relatively comprehensive (if none too  robust and in some cases 
extrapolated from too few micro bits and pieces) data base and coherent analysis linking PPP 
(production by poor people), UABS (universal access toward basic services), SNAP (safety 
net access provision). Virtually all o f  the strategic/policy elements were fully incorporated in 
DNP which had created - and staffed with an initial two second degree M ozambican 
professionals - a specialist unit (Unidade por Alleviacao Pobreza) to  keep data and analysis 
flowing. All implementation was by line Ministries, local government and - m ore tentatively - 
partnerships between government and social sector.
With the exception o f  South Africa, no SSA country can claim as much explicit attention to 
poverty reduction (the Mozambican goal - alleviation is the Bank's unfortunate choice o f  term) 
via PPP-UABS-SNAP, even if less explicitly and coherently Tanzania (and in a different fiscal 
and political context Botswana) arguably have a longer history and more program m ing related 
to  poverty reduction as a socio and politico economic (and in Tanzania as in M ozam bique - 
but not Botswana - macro and fiscal economic as well) priority.
That the articulation and programming are uneven - laterally and vertically - is a valid criticism 
as is the somewhat heuristic (rather than rigorously analysed) interaction o f  program m e and 
policy pieces. But this is partly related to  the recent start-up (SDA's pre-history begins in 
1986 and UAP dates only to  1994) and also to the shortage o f  M ozambican staff at analytical 
and review as well as administrative and implementational levels not just within DNP but 
generally. Further, compared to  at least one older, better funded programming approach in a 
context o f  readily available high level personnel - that o f  the Philippines - the M ozambican 
appears much more rigorous analytically, coherent in relation o f parts to  the overall strategy 
and to  looking ex ante and ex post at results/resources ratios. The contrast with PAM SCA D
A r e a s  O f  In f l u e n c e /R e s u l t s
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(and its descendants) in Ghana is also instructive. Precisely because it was encapsulated and 
parallel, PAM SCAD has not kept poverty reduction squarely in the forefront o f  the political 
economic agenda nor (except perhaps in Health and parts o f Education) generated a main line 
Ministry focus on it. Poverty-decentralisation-partnership with the social sector (which is 
major in the Health Sector) have not been seen as interlocking. No vision o f  PPP-UABS- 
SNAP (indeed no real SNAP at all and precious little overt attention to PPP) as a strategic 
focus triangle has developed even if the second is a de facto priority and the first is 
subliminally present in the President's forward economic vision. W eaknesses elsewhere do not 
o f  course constitute justification o f  weaknesses in SDA (even if  balanced by strengths) but 
they do set in perspective the difficulty o f  conceptualising, prioritising, articulating and acting 
on poverty reduction as a goal. Despite the weaknesses, both the Philippines and Ghana are 
reducing absolute poverty and moving tow ard UABS and - in the Philippine case - some bits 
o f  SNAP. Being in some respects comparable and in some stronger is an achievement. True - 
as Dr. Schuman stressed in GAPVU reports - the political commitment to poverty reduction 
was the essential bottom  line. W ithout it SDA would have had no impact whatsoever. But 
w ithout SDA (or a similar substitute) the data, analysis, strategy and programmatic 
articulation for making that political commitment operational (and saleable to  donors) would 
almost certainly not have existed in 1995 as it surely did not in 1986.
M ore specific areas in which SDA (and its pre-history) have been involved and appear to  have 
had an impact are:
SNAP (Safety Net Access Provision)
•  GAPVU - began as a response to  collapse o f  ration system as a food security device. It 
was designed by Magid Osman plus UNICEF consultant (later SSPA) and UNICEF paid 
staff person (now Director). Initial proposal for soup kitchens redesigned as cash income 
supplement linked to child/pregnant women failure to gain weight and - in principle (not 
fully implemented) aged, disabled, female-headed with no formal sector job  households. 
Payments almost all made to women partly because interim weight non-gain system 
(proposed by Igreja Campos) identifies women and (via children) mothers. (These were 
identified as categories covering 90% o f absolutely poor households.) Slow start (first 
D irector very weak). Redesigned and brought into full operation with DTZ technical 
assistance which was brilliant on institutional structure and operation and good on 
articulation concept. Continuing SDA monitoring interest.
•  ’'Supplement" - parallel to GAPVU for large, low salaries civil service households.
Failure because no lead person in Finance to implement (should have been easier to 
implement than GAPVU). Until higher real public service pay this is a serious gap as up 
to  30% M aputo public service households in absolute poverty. (It may seem humorous a
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police sergeant plus wife and six children live in abandoned lion cage in Beira Zoo but it is 
a symbol o f  context eroding public service productivity, morale and morality).
•  Food Security (drought impact alleviation). The first case was in the pre-history period - 
Tete 1988. A reconnaissance (for MF) revealed a total grain crop failure plus a total 
bureaucratic failure to  get food in to be sold (aid grain existed, cleared for export at 
Bulawayo and aid agencies plus Charbomac had lorries) meant up to  20,000 famine deaths 
plus chaotic civil disorder if  6,000 tonnes o f  grain did not arrive in 6 weeks (versus 500 
over previous 13). Vehement action by MF and UNICEF secured just in time shipments 
and up to a point better monitoring/more flexibility reducing subsequent "bureaucracy 
driven" famine risk.
The 1990/91 drought - 1991/92 hunger crisis threatened to be a worse case o f 'to o  late - 
they died before the food came' response. Unlike Tete '88 it was not merely national but 
regional. In SADC (then the 10) 3 million were likely to die on 'normal aid management' 
projections o f  whom at least 500,000 and potentially up to  1,000,000 in Mozambique. In 
early 1992 SDA put the case forcefully to  ND, JM and (via Sergio) Prime M inister as well 
as directly to  UNICEF and UNDP (which then recalled warnings by SDA in late 1991 it 
had then viewed as boring tunnel vision). The response -plus parallel action by S ADCC 
Food Security Zimbabwe, WFP, UNICEF and some NGOs - forced the FAO to bring 
FAO/W FP mission from June to March and to associate UNICEF with it. The earlier 
mission plus its acceptance o f  SDA-Emergencia-SADCC-UNICEF data allowed a June 
Regional Conference (the first UN-Recipient Regional Body co-sponsored one) which 
allowed food aid response to be barely in time to avert "aid administration famine". The 
death toll (including associated illnesses and stress deaths 'on the move') was perhaps
200,000 with up to  100,000 in Mozambique because o f  w ar and war-related logistic 
defacilitation o f  emergency food delivery. SDA was - contrary to some donor opinion - 
central in the Mozambican high level policy and pressure response. W hat was leaked to 
donors was in fact SDA memo/minute not the personal views o f  SSPA and as leak came at 
higher level in CNP (or PM's office) must in general terms had GOM  backing. The "Four 
Horsemen" monograph which went to a 75 person donor government, regional decision- 
taker, international organisation and external NGO list was over SSPA's academic title 
from IDS because there was not time to work through a detailed official GOM  proposal, a 
nominally personal presentation could use harsher words and because o f  regional frame o f  
drought/needed response a detailed official paper would have required tedious inter­
country vetting. This does not detract from the reality o f  no SDA/no paper/less rapid 
international response/more deaths. The donor communities' complacency about results 
(after the event) is disturbing. Countries and their personnel plus SADCC Food Security 
sounded the alarm and a few people (e.g. Jan Pronk), agencies (W FP-M aputo, U N ICEF-
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M aputo/Nairobi/New York) heard in time to get the grain moving in time to  save lives 
given that the region had on its own initiative se tu p  transport/logistical plans and 
monitoring processes regionally and in most countries. Left to donor devices and standard 
operating procedures the 3,000,000 persons would have died.
In both the Tete and Great Drought cases it is clear early, public alarm raising had two 
special values: a) deaths after warnings force a quest for a scapegoat and agencies/persons 
seek to avoid that role; b) the warning triggers a moral response - "We probably cannot 
succeed but history will not forgive us if  we do not try" as one Agency M aputo head 
w rote in 1992.
Other food security w ork led, as noted, to  GAPVU (a low admin cost, market friendly 
approach to household food deficits caused by lack o f  entitlements) and to  (not very feasible 
in the event) proposals for expanded labour intensive public construction w orks (work per pay 
to  buy food) proposals. Review o f the ration system (1988-89) intended to  strengthen it led 
to  growing doubts as to administrative feasibility especially in a more market responsive 
strategic context. Proposals for a yellow maize subsidy (a non-preferred but nutritionally 
acceptable staple food one donor had in unlimited supply) did, in principle, get USAID 
backing. However, USAID commissioned a Cornell (IFPRI) study not completed until 1994 
so that the time for that idea came and went before AID was ready to  act. From 1992 SDA 
warned that Mozambique was moving to a situation in which effective commercial 
procurem ent and movement o f grain from surplus rural to  urban areas (urban physical supply 
and household producer income entitlements) would be crucial because in normal to  good 
harvest years from - say - 1995 net national maize import requirements would be low or nil. 
Unfortunately neither government grain procurement nor financial institutions responded to 
that message - indeed it is unclear CNP channels ever passed it on to them.
U ABS (Universal Access to Basic Services)
•  Health - pre-history work with Saude included resisting further fee experimentation 
(reduced access, encouraged corruption, ate up nurse/storekeeper time, raised no net 
revenue), co-ordination o f  Provincial and Ministry budgets, bringing donor aid in kind into 
Saude books to  increase understanding o f  what was happening. Subsequent liaison was 
SSPA-VM partly on GAPVU and partly on overall review o f poverty situation as 
perceived from medical (including nutrition) perspective.
•  Education - SDA identified problems as, a) untrained teachers; b) 3 shift system; c) near 
absence o f  texts and materials (tables, chairs, chalk, pencils); d) rapid decrease in rural 
enrolment masked at overall level by rapid urban rise; e) lack o f  Ministry (or at least 
Planning/Policy Directorate) understanding o f  provincial-district-school levels; f) tw o-
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thirds fail rate on initial year Portuguese teaching; g) misguided belief large, foreign 
contractor primary school rehabilitation/building would (indeed was even relevant to) 
basic problems a-b-c-d-e-f. Unfortunately while VM  and ND did not disagree they had no 
great influence on Educacao and SDA had few direct links. Negatively SDA may have 
contributed to downgrading by CNP and Bank o f  primary school building (at one point
5,000 at $50 million by Soares e Costa seriously proposed!) and positively pointing to  
reconstruction (and political) need to restore rural primary enrolment and social (and 
political) non-feasibility o f  capping (let alone cutting urban) which has led to  serious 
dialogue on cost sharing with social sector (e.g. church) complementary schools and 
tow ard raising Educacao's budget. (The old 'Plan' target o f  a 50% 1990-1995 fall in rural 
primary enrolment is clearly an historical oddity not an example o f  continuing tunnel 
vision. That 'Plan' was a computerised, macro, hypothetical number crunching exercise by 
'cooperantes' in fact accountable only to  themselves. SDA's one clear impact on Educacao 
was to  catalyse discrediting o f  that approach - and the model builders in question.)
•  W ater - SDA reviewed and underlined importance for rehabilitation. SAF financed one 
project. The low degree o f  involvement indicates more that SDA viewed Agua as 
basically on target as to  goals, methods and building up cost sharing and participation than 
lack o f  priority. The preliminary monitoring on the M aputo barrio fontenaria project 
suggests this may have been too optimistic a perception and UAP may wish to  check what 
actual position is.
P P P  (P r o d u c t io n  b y  P o o r  P e o p l e )
• Priority Districts focusing on small family farming rehabilitation, basic infrastructure 
reconstruction and basic services revival were the topic o f  an inter-ministerial com m ittee 
serviced by the SSPA (before his appointment as such). They did get the PPP - 
Decentralisation nexus and the need for District level baseline data (and implementation 
capacity) on the agenda but little more. In retrospect three major weaknesses limited 
results:
a. no Committee member was full time so ideas and inputs were channelled to  a near 
vacuum;
b. the Bank (which wanted 3 pilots leading to 10 in year three) made a take-over bid 
which in fact killed off the Committee and any general sense o f  M ozambican 
ownership;
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c. the ex-Physical Planning Centre in search o f a new role converted itself into an 
autonomous (nominally reporting to VM o f Planning and coordinating closely with 
nobody) integrated rural development institute and would-be empire. It used the 
known weakness o f  Provincial and - especially - District governance to  propose that 
the Centre head up a constellation o f  villages with parallel delivery systems. Apart 
from its technical unsoundness, this approach alienated DNP, line Ministries, local 
government so there was in practice no political backing to achieve funding.
The coup de grace may have been the W orld Bank project advisory team led by a syndico 
anarchist (!) which produced an incompetent and in part fraudulent report, e.g. they visited 
one District with no notice. All relevant staff and several Provincial Directors were out all 
day at inauguration o f  a District-Province-UNICEF project. The team drank beer and 
rested, flew back to M aputo, w rote a highly detailed highly critical report. (Bank M aputo 
office, at least in private, accepted mission was a disaster.)
The concept o f  decentralisation to  District level remained alive. The greatest obstacles to 
success are:
a. convincing donors to  accept a broad enough base and a rapid enough generalisation to 
meet Mozambican economic and political requirements;
b. avoiding creation o f  a 'parallel government', i.e. achieving incorporation o f  the 
programme in the Ministry - Provincial - District structures to avoid the diseconomies 
o f  parallel governance, avert the creation o f a unified Ministerial-Provincial-District 
antipathy to the 'pampered', foreign financed, 'externally owned' (as perceived by them 
and quite probably really so in actual content relevance to Mozambique terms) intruder 
and to create a lasting support base for generalisation/incorporation;
c. involving Ministries and Provinces from the start because sectoral guidelines are a 
Ministerial responsibility and because (even with training programmes) Mozambican 
Districts have next to  no technical capacity and must use Ministerial and - especially - 
Provincial or depend on an isolated, ephemeral, largely expatriate project cadre.
These factors suggest an initial Province (all Districts) with the second and third in 
subsequent years (e.g. M aputo, Tete, Nyasa) would have a better chance o f  success than 
more dispersed single Districts and that the Rural Development Institute should not have a 
central design or management role. A Provincial (all Districts) approach should be 
complementary to the Provincial Planning exercise. Another area needing to be 
coordinated with both is the economic corridor approach: Beira Corridor Authority plus
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South African/Mozambique Mpulunga-Resano Garcia - M aputo economic corridor (on 
which South Africa clearly means business).
• Reconstrucao - see detailed SDA paper thereon - was/is the most elaborate micro to  
macro sectoral planning proposal Mozambique has done to date. It links decentralisation - 
small farming family livelihood - rural commerce and transport - basic services recovery - 
basic infrastructure rebuilding (by labour intensive means) with tentative costs, outputs, 
GDP, food security, external balance, fiscal and aid requirement projections. Except for 
the return o f  refugees component (now overtaken by donor lag and events - i.e. return  on 
their own) it remain relevant if donors can be convinced small rural livelihood 
rehabilitation is - directly and by multiplier effects - the most cost efficient (as well as m ost 
absolute poverty reducing, food security enhancing, socio-politically 
stabilising/strengthening) strategy for macro economic rehabilitation in M ozambique. The 
paper is a SDA product, but DNP and CNP concurred with it (and in a broad sense asked 
for a systematic conceptualisation on these lines and also for revisions at various stages). 
The problem is donor (by no means only World Bank) inability to  see production by poor 
people as o f  macro economic strategic importance. (It is in M ozambique, Tanzania, 
Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somaliland, Liberia, Sierra Leone with Nigeria, Zaire, Angola mixed 
cases and is not very GDP growth relevant in Namibia and Botswana. The m acro 
overlooking o f  PPP in Uganda explains the superficially odd interaction o f  high GDP 
growth, fiscal rectitude, a hard currency with increased immiserisation plus rising social 
and political tensions in Uganda, which is a mixed case in which either PPP or a large unit 
focused macro strategy - or a blend - could yield good GDP results.)
• Land has been an SDA topic directly linked to an ongoing debate. The SDA them es have 
been:
a. no land should be alienated to ex-freehold (ex-colon) sector if it is historic traditional 
tenure land (i.e. Portuguese never stole it) or has a small farming household population 
in place as a result o f  war or abandoning empressas' to employers (60,000 o f  whom  
were promised land o f  closed down empresses by Magid Osman as their term ination 
payment partly since there was no other means to offer anything at all and partly 
because what they new how to do was to form). To a large extent (all but the 
abandoned empressas - e.g. in Angonia - resettled by returning refugees this SDA 
stance is in fact the legal and constitutional position with the title issuance often 
patently unlawful;
b. because the Portuguese never had a central register o f historic (traditional) tenure 
lands, because o f  empressa and village creation/abandonment and because o f  
war/returns implementing "a" requires ground level data collection - specifically so
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case by case before any alienation and, over 1997-2000, to build up the first national 
land register;
c. for the small farming household sector the basic allocation should be at District level - 
perhaps by an elders' committee subject to District government supervision and 
Provincial guidelines;
d. however, one break with historic pattern is needed (where it has not already occurred). 
All households - i.e. including female headed ones - should have equal right to secure, 
inheritable land use rights. Traditionally titles were household (not personal) and 
female-headed households did not exist. Now 20% to 40% are female-headed in many 
rural areas. In some o f these, female-headed households do have access but probably 
not in all. Further, in some Districts the operation o f the allocation process has 
become a corrupt regulo enriching exercise bearing no relation either to  equity or to 
tradition.
The debate continues but the wholesale Lands Commission handing out o f  title to largely 
occupied and certainly never checked lands appears to have been averted (or at least 
radically reduced), process in which Provincial Governors (facing the risk o f  riot) and 
Parliament (furious at 'recolonisation') have doubtless provided all o f  the political muscle 
(i.e. not SDA which may have had a techno intellectual influence).
W hat has not happened is the scrapping o f  the Alfonso d'Albaquerque pattern concession 
system. That gives an initial marketing monopoly (now on some, not all, crops) to  the 
concessionaire and the right to take a share (often a third) o f  monopoly marketing area for 
plantations. The first is bad market economics (and alienates rural households, stifles rural 
commerce) while the second is patently unconstitutional by seizure w ithout consultation or 
compensation o f traditional tenure rights. The SDA challenge to the "heirs o f  Alfonso 
d'Albaquerque" in the Lands Commission should be continued. It is politically dangerous, 
economically unsound and morally obscene that this ultra colonial way o f stealing poor 
people's lands and livelihood lives on two decades after independence. (The W orld Bank - 
largely on economic but also on poverty, social, Anglo-American practice grounds - 
concurs.) In Africa only Mozambique, Angola and Guinea Bissau continue this system. 
Tanzania does expropriate land for large enterprise users, but is legally required to consult, 
to pay and to  resettle and (albeit imperfectly) does so.
The above is not a case against selective involvement o f enterprises - including foreign - in 
agriculture. With consultation, compensation, 'outgrower' and support for small farming 
family supplier (on short, e.g. 1 to 3 year contracts not perpetuities) they may be useful for 
some crops (e.g. sugar) and in some zones (e.g. areas with no surface w ater but tappable
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aquifers, which may include parts ofN yasa north ofLichinga and parts o f interior Gaza, 
M aputo and Inhambane plus - less probably - coastal Nampula). However, the im pact (on 
experience elsewhere) is likely to  be marginal, enclavised and in at most 10% o f  all 
Districts.
• Hire Purchase has been an SDA proposal directly related to rural com m erce/transport 
(the enterprises normally do both) and to urban small enterprise. Bank credit is not 
available and nor BCM, BPD or even Standard - Totta has the capability to run extensive 
hire purchase schemes. Sweden (and potentially EU  and USAID) are interested (each has 
at least one study the EU  one with an indirect SDA input). The poverty relevance is that 
rural com merce/transport and urban small scale manufacturing, transport and construction 
are vital to  enhancing poor peoples livelihood opportunities. The borrowers are not poor 
now and if  they succeed will be rich so no subsidy is appropriate - effective access to  
credit is. To date (unless SID A has set up proposed enterprise) no action, apparently as a 
result o f  this specialised proposal dropping out o f  political decision taker sight range 
because o f  larger and higher profile issue overload. (VM, PM approved in principle.)
UAP may wish to  follow up.
• Urban small enterprise w ork by SDA has been limited. The Hire Purchase proposals 
could relate (albeit initiated in rural context) and link to making Em prego (now in Labour 
under Urban Rehabilitation rubric) permanent for promotion, counselling training and - 
perhaps - fund channelling to a commercial hire purchase enterprise capable o f  handling 
the commercial side (as BPD assuredly is not and will not be any time soon). O ther SDA 
suggestions were to merge the three competing Small Enterprise programm es/institutes 
which institutional self defence prevented largely because each has a different parent 
ministry and a different external funding partner who are jealous of'their' tu rf  and view 
that as a more central priority than SDA (or DNP) did forcing through unification.
In c o r p o r a t in g  P o v e r t y  Im p a c t  In  Pr o j e c t  A n a l y s is
This goal - which was prioritised by both Mozambique and the Bank - was SDA's one area o f  
total failure. A technically competent Project Advisor was hired funded by DTZ and the 
capital (project) planning team was willing to have poverty impact assessment included. 
Therefore, the reason is not self evident but seems to have turned on a non-fit at personal style 
level between that advisor and Mozambican (and other SDA advisor) personnel.
There was - and is - a practical problem. DNP does not normally collect data on its ow n but 
reviews projects as submitted by Ministries and other government bodies. These rarely
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include any poverty impact content and almost never - with the partial exceptions o f  Saude 
and Agua - any detailed data providing a base for such analysis.
It was suggested to PA that he should establish direct links with Planning Units in health and 
either W orks and W ater or Transport to sensitise these units to the need for poverty impact 
analysis and train them in doing it. On that base a more generalised seminar and training 
programme could have been mounted. Although the PA agreed verbally with this 1992 
proposal (from the SSPA) he did not in fact act on it. The ND either had inadequate time to 
pursue the matter or - given the relationship problem - believed doing so to be inexpedient.
The same route o f  close liaison on one sectoral Ministry Planning Unit to build up a poverty 
impact assessment procedure would still appear to be the most practicable entry point for 
UAP. To generalise will still require a senior level workshop plus a three week training course 
for Ministerial and Provincial project preparation/evaluation officers.
W a g e s  - P o v e r t y  a n d  D e m a n d  A s p e c t s
SDA (from its prehistory) advised on wages especially in the public sector. The thrust was to 
avert further erosion o f  real wages because:
a. most wages were very far below the household absolute poverty line;
b. formal sector wages formed the largest component o f demand for both formal and 
informal sector production;
c. even above the absolute poverty line salaries were so low as to provide negative incentives 
to  staying in the public service (or indeed Mozambique) and maximum ones to  running 
other earning activities (from consultancy services through vehicle repairs to  petty theft 
and - not always petty - corruption) on government time, thereby contributing to 
professional personnel shortages and erosion o f  public servant productivity/public service 
quality.
This was not an area o f  great objective success measured by results. SDA's failure, however, 
w as not primarily either in inability to  keep the issue on the policy agenda or to  convince 
Mozambican decision takers. Rather it was unable to  provide arguments for them to deploy 
capable o f  fully convincing World Bank PER (Public Expenditure Review) hit teams let alone 
the IMF.
Later SDA narrowed its focus to the government service because:
a. o f  necessity the government set their wages;
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b. these had declined to ranges o f  $25-200, the former about one third a M aputo household 
absolute poverty line. For primary teachers, nurses, constables $35 was an average or 
above salary;
c. the poverty o f  public servants automatically led to poverty o f  public services - '"coping" 
(earning) took time away from these services with low morale further eroding them;
d. at the upper end o f  the range, $200 was under one half a South African low er middle class 
budget ($500) and led directly to a loss o f  citizen professionals equal to  new graduate 
hiring (about 200 a year out o f  2,000 total) requiring 2,000 to  2,500 TA personnel to  plug 
the gap with the latter costing $300 million a year versus a 1995 citizen non-military 
payroll (for 110,000) o f under $50 million;
e. which w as absurd in terms o f  human investment, public service delivery, public service 
productivity, 'ownership' and cost o f combined citizen and TA personnel.
The W orld Bank in general terms came to agree. Bilaterals were less convinced. In particular 
only the Bank and UNDP tentatively agreed that a direct shift from technical assistance to 
budget support to  allow funding a $50-500 public service salary range was theoretically 
economically prudent and some shift to raise professional salaries was urgent. The Bank's 
own 1993-94 initiative was, however, limited to graduates (excluding the basic service 
deliverers - teachers, nurses, constables, w ater technicians, road foremen, tax officers etc.), 
under financed and too  intrusive into/disruptive o f  Mozambican public service salary 
management to  prove viable.
UNICEF/UNDP in 1995 financed a study on Public Service Pay, Productivity and 
Professionalism based on Mali, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania and M ozambique, led by 
Professor Adebayo Adedeji (and including the SSPA in his personal capacity). In origin it 
flowed from M agid Osman's presentation to the founding M aastricht Conference o f  the Global 
Coalition for Africa. That presentation was a spin o ff o f  the initial SDA design process.
The Adedeji Report (main text/Mozambique Annex available from sometime SSPA) endorses 
- perhaps not surprisingly - the SDA position. It has UNDP (E. Sirleef-Johnson H ead o f  
Africa Section and A. R. Jolly o f  Human Development unit), residual UNICEF (Dpty.
Director S. Lewis, R. M organ o f  ESARO) support and substantial Bank approval if 
financeable (but doubts were expressed by Vice President Jaycox donors will shift TA  to  
budget support however desirable). In principle UNDP and UNICEF will finance/assist 
follow-up studies/private consultants (including ex-Adedeji Team members) to  interested 
countries and especially the ones studied. The Bank probably, would like to see one or more 
o f  the five put up a 'pilot' proposal and might back it. However, it apparently w ould favour
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phasing in over 3 to  5 years sector by sector (e.g. with Tax Collection, Finance and Planning, 
Health, Water, Works, perhaps Police in year one in Mozambique).
SDA might usefully consider taking up this option and (presumably via ND/DNP) discuss with 
UNICEF and/or UNDP initially at M aputo Office level but perhaps with parallel contact with 
more senior backers noted above.
The issue is important both for direct poverty level implications and (more saleable to  Bank 
and, perhaps, bilaterals) because immiserising public servants destroys both market enabling 
policy and human investment plus infrastructure service delivery capacity and therefore 
impoverishes the entire economy statically and dynamically. In addition because the low pay 
drives Mozambican graduates abroad (probably 3,500 o f  6,000 at present) it increases 
turnover - with consequential loss o f  historic memory and continuity - and 'requires' bringing 
in TA personnel and foreign NGOs(decapacitating the state and eroding Mozambican 
'ownership'). This analysis is forceful but it is a line with which - at least in small group 
discussions - Vice President Jaycox broadly concurs as long as the "be fair to civil servants" 
theme is peripheral and the governance and production efficiency ones are central.
D e c e n t r a l is a t io n  - P r o v in c ia l  P l a n n in g
SDA has been involved in decentralisation issues - mechanisms - from its prehistory days. The 
Priority District Programme was inter alia about decentralisation as was the (to date non­
functional) user committee element in the SAF financed fontenario project. SAF - implicitly 
and perhaps now more explicitly - is about basic services, small projects, local government and 
social sector (decentralised from M aputo government core) provision.
The SDA approach to decentralisation and participation (the former not necessarily including 
the latter but essential for user participation to have a direct impact on operations) was 
relatively pragmatic and perhaps inadequately conceptualised/articulated:
a. small scale contextual PPP-UABS-SNAP projects to give flesh to macro, sectoral and 
provincial guidelines require user and local official data input and operational 
involvement/commitment to  be efficient or effective;
b. given communication and data processing problems most o f this data cannot (and probably 
in any case need not) go beyond Provincial level to a DNP (or other) data bank;
c. ordinary households - especially poor ones - have micro understandings o f  their own needs 
and capacities officials/other experts (and especially those at substantial physical,
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educational and status distances) frequently do not have, just as the latter have - o r can 
have - more macro and conceptual insights;
d. transparency and accountability to  users (at all levels) improve governance and reduce 
risks o f  corruption and/or inefficiency;
e. most people do put a value on being able to  influence governance to provide user desired, 
user friendly services;
f. social sector bodies - with the partial exception o f  churches and trade unions - are m ost 
effective at local level and can only relate effectively in detail at that level even if  guidelines 
for cooperation - dialogue - partnership can and should be nationally and provincially 
designed;
g. substantial decentralisation at micro and middle level design and in operations requires 
clear central strategic guidelines and policies to avert not merely chaotic non coordination 
but also conflict;
h. Mozambican Provinces have - in practice - substantial recurrent budget program m e 
powers - even if most do not use them - with some potential gains as to  efficiency and 
ownership. These are largely vitiated by unclarity o f  Ministerial/Provincial responsibilities 
and because Capital Budgets plus initial Recurrent Budget project funding from  donors are 
handled by Ministries. The subsequent handover to Provinces as external funding runs out 
is frequently a disaster because the Province has never 'owned' the projects and is given a 
new cost with no offsetting revenue gains. SDA has argued that all capital budget items 
corresponding to recurrent activities which are Provincial responsibilities should be in the 
Provincial Budgets (and officer work schedules) from day 1. Inertia (by parent ministries, 
donors and the Ministry o f  Finance) has to  date stalled action.
W hether this list is an adequate conceptualisation, as opposed to a functional checkpoint list is 
problematic. In general it reflects SSPA's and SPA's work (not PA's which was implicitly 
centralisation oriented) but neither reflected on decentralisation and (more seriously) 
participation as ends in themselves even in the former's papers for Local Government.
The so-called Provincial/District debate is ultimately a capacity issue. U ser com m ittees (and 
District Assemblies) can propose, take part in design, participate in operations (not limited to 
funding), help with monitoring down to delivery unit (Posto, Centro, Primary School) level. 
District staff can implement basic projects designed for labour intensive forem an/artisan led 
teams. But Districts have no engineers (road or water or building) to  draw up plans and 
engineering designs; unqualified bookkeepers (typical District Finance officers cadre) cannot 
do financial planning, etc. Therefore, the medium term technical planning, design, supervision
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capacity can only be Provincial. (Tanzania can and does decentralise to District level. But it 
has over 2,500 graduates in District level posts - more than the total Mozambican degree 
holders in the public service. A strong Tanzanian District has staffing comparable to  half o f  
Mozambique's Provinces.
SDA's arrival point in this area is the Provincial Planing Process (including its attempt to 
revive the role o f  the Provincial Planning Directors which by 1993 was vestigial since there 
had been no real Provincial planning for more than a decade). This draws on lessons o f  PDP 
and is a substantially stronger - and (unevenly) more Provincially based exercise. SDA was 
heavily involved in design (SSPA, SPA), field data collection/dialogue (SPA, PA) and 
macro/sectoral analysis and write-up (SSPA). The first round produced - as SDA expected - 
a relatively weak plan but - as SDA hoped - a foundation on which to  build. I f  PP is to be the 
base for decentralisation, UAP will need to take a continuing interest.
R e f l e c t io n s  -  B a c k w a r d  a n d  F o r w a r d
SDA in terms o f  its strategic aim o f creating poverty reduction analytical and formulation
capacity in the Government o f  Mozambique has been a success. The numerous problems and
limitations cited do not alter the basic reality o f substantial achievement:
a. poverty reduction is a strategic theme in government (both political and senior public 
servant discourse);
b. a growing data base and a habit o f  analysing it in poverty terms has been created in 
UAP/DNP/DNE;
c. a Mozambican unit for handling data coordination (and advising on collection) plus 
analysis and relating result to  ongoing strategic and policy issues exists (UAP) and is now 
staffed by professionally qualified Mozambicans;
d. the output o f  UAP (as o f  SDA) are used by DNP and - up to a point - by DPPs and by 
NDs in other Ministries and Institutos (e.g. Saude, SEAS, GAPVU);
e. the international co-operating community is aware that Mozambique places strategic ideas 
about poverty reduction and has articulated, argued positions on how, where, when (albeit 
its degree o f  willingness to focus poverty reduction dialogue on the Mozambican agenda is 
limited);
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*f. after a difficult start-up GAPVU is clearly useful (indeed the target o f  over ambitious 
generalisers, e.g. toward a rural GAPVU) and the reformed/spun-off SAF can prove to  be 
so;
g. a significant volume o f  data, analyses and studies exist (assuming all or m ost can be 
located and filed) to provide a baseline and guide further work;
h. the need to  hire additional Mozambican professionals for UAP and to provide poverty 
reduction oriented training (either by UAP or outside Mozambique) to  senior professionals 
(national and regional director and senior analyst level) is recognised, albeit how  to  move 
ahead is less than clearly articulated;
i. as is the need for wider dissemination o f  studies and more frequent w orkshops or seminars 
with senior personnel o f  ministries/institutes, provinces and social sector organisations 
albeit to  do so may be impracticable until the personnel bottleneck is deconstructed;
j. UAP - in common with DNP - has focused on influence and contribution not operation 
and dominance, i.e. acting at first instance via DNP and more generally via main operating 
government and (to date peripherally) social sector groups not running program m es on its 
own nor having institutos (e.g. GAPVU) reporting to it even if it plays a special analytical 
supporting and monitoring role. This is a clear determination for "mainstreaming" and 
rejection o f  the 'poor enclavised parallel programmes by weak units for poor excluded 
people with weak organisational capacity' approach which - in practice - is the result o f  
trying to  operationalise poverty reduction in special programmes under a Poverty M inistry 
or D epartm ent which usually comes to be at macro level the mirror o f  poo r households at 
community level.
The danger which should be flagged is that this record was achieved via tw o (the third not 
having been effective) expatriates who perceived themselves as "owned by" M ozam bique - 
both now moved on, and tw o citizens, who may not still be with UAP in tw o years time. A 
stable base for progress cannot be secure unless and until the core citizen professional cadre is 
at least four and turnover has been reduced (primarily by rendering GOM  rem uneration less 
stupendously unattractive - e.g. by raising National D irector pay to $500-750 a m onth and 
other senior professionals to $400-600 a month).
A full time expatriate would no longer be as opposed to useful as a small cluster o f  semi­
specialised ones experienced in SSA (and preferably Mozambique) who w ould make regular 
visits o f  up to  four weeks to  observe, monitor, consult with Mozambicans, advise. It is not 
now possible to revert to  a fully expatriate staffed or led unit without grave loss o f  momentum 
and influence. The historic context which made that possible over 1988-93 has passed and
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new expatriates would not have the initial non-SDA history o f  involvement which made the 
SSPA acceptable in a post which was among those in which citizenship was logically a 
particularly important qualification.
Reviewing limitations has been attempted earlier. What may be more useful in a forward 
looking envoi is drawing guide posts for strengthening. Some o f these are by no means 
unique to  UAP but pertain to  Mozambican governmental structures and work procedures 
generally:
1. Develop an effective filing system based on Anglophone African topical files including an 
index sheet, minutes, short memoranda and references to  relevant longer studies. Ideally 
there should be at least one file on each major topical area and one for every institution 
with which UAP is in regular conduct. Quantitative data needed for analysis should be 
held on computer (floppy disc) in a manipulative form but - given the exigencies o f  pow er 
and machine handling - always with a backup printout as well as a backup disc. Until a 
DNP filing system exists these files (and related studies) should be held - and checked out 
by - the UAP Admin officer.
2. Build up an historical memory based on the files with pre hand over briefing from outgoing 
to  incoming officers, a "familiarisation tour d' horizon" o f  the files by new arrivals and 
regular reference to past data-analysis-proposals-monitoring-results as part o f  all major
exercises.
3. Seek to enlarge UAP to four Mozambican professionals (plus a data analysis specialist) 
and to  reduce turnover so that at any time at least half will have two or more years o f  
experience. That relates to  a substantial degree to overall pay o f  Mozambican public 
servants which is a substantive issue referred to  above, i.e. UAP cannot be enclavised - 
better pay leading to lower turnover is a systemic problem to which a systemic solution is 
needed.
4. Develop a systematic set o f  contact points/persons in units (public service and social 
sector) directly relevant in respect to data supply, analytical or programme inputs, 
dialogue on strategy and policy, programme development and implementation. This is 
needed to have data, realise opportunities, broaden dissemination, build up 'alliances' on 
issues on which different views exist in public service (e.g. UAP-Local Government- 
Provincial Govemors-National Women's Organisation, are logical allies against random 
alimentation o f  small farming household land and for radical reform o f Lands Commissions 
context-data base-objectives).
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5. Collaborate with DNE to achieve a coordinated review o f all major public sector data 
collection and analysis exercises - especially those carried out by technical assistance 
consultants provided by donors:
a. to  know what data will be available when;
b. to limit overlap and to increase comparability among studies;
c. to  establish DNE as the central data coordinator (not necessarily collector/analyst for 
specialised studies Ministries can and wish to do); and
d. to  establish UAP stake in being able to ensure data collection-analysis are designed to  
provide data on aspects o f  poverty in health, education, water agriculture, transport 
access as much as in Household Income or Food Security.
W hether the UAP/DNE relationship needs to be formalised (beyond a note o f  
understanding on file so personnel turnover does not lead to its being forgotten) is not 
self-evident. Guidelines for Ministries, Provinces and Institutos (copied to  ’donors') should 
be issued by the Planning Commission for DNE. This is not a purely 
technical/administrative issue - some donors, e.g. USAID have clear political agendas 
behind their topic-procedure-consultant selection which if  uncontrolled, especially if  not 
recognised, will deprive Mozambique o f  ownership o f the way its data base evolves. The 
UNDP or W orld Bank operator for household survey and the DNE/UNDP or 
Comell/USAID poverty base dialogues w ere ultimately about control o f  data and - 
because D N P and especially DNE and SDA saw them as such - w ere largely 'won' by 
Mozambique;
6. Use that collaboration to  build a systematic quantitative data base using five basic 
censi/broad sample surveys:
a. household - urban
b. household - rural
c. small farming household (with income and expenditure, land access, basic service 
access, nutrition and food security, health states covered as well as more narrowly 
agricultural aspects;
d. employment/economic activity survey covering non-agricultural large, medium, micro 
and household enterprise and corporate-partnership-large household farming;
e. census.
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In theory, a-b-c-d could be folded into e, but the resultant questionnaire would in fact be 
too long for effective administration and because Censi are complete enumerations the 
processing capacity problems would be exacerbated. In principle b and c could be 
combined - an area w orth exploring with DNE and Agricultura. Each o f  these surveys 
should have adequate samples to yield Provincial (as well as National) and ultimately 
District results. District results would probably require a national sample o f  at least
15,000 so may need to await second or third rounds. The Surveys are needed at five year 
intervals (one per year not all five in one) until smaller annual update surveys can be 
developed and tested at which point the main Surveys could be at ten year intervals.
7. Supplemented by "Sentinel Surveys" in the areas o f  Health, Food Security and any others 
sectoral or social sector bodies do - can be encouraged to  - operate them. It is pointless to  
argue these (ideally for 30 odd representative barrios and 30 odd representative Districts) 
have limitations in term s o f  statistical validity. They are basically early alerting 
mechanisms providing information more rapidly than surveys can to allow policy and 
programme amendment. (The Provincial/National emergencia data system to  identify food 
needs is basically o f  this type.) Here tw o institutional steps are needed.
a. all sentinel survey operators or would-be operators should be urged (required for 
government bodies) to  liaise and discuss with DNP (especially but not only UAP) and
b. all sentinel survey operators should be required by law to copy results promptly to 
relevant sectoral Ministry (plus Provincial and District analogues) and to  DNP.
"b" is not bureaucratic formalism. World Vision and SCF operate a large, well designed 
Health Sentinel System (apparently USAID funded). It uses inputs only from non­
government sources and informs only sources/external NGOs/some donors - not Saude at 
any level except by chance or personal relationship - o f  results. That is quite literally 
subversive o f  health, o f  orderly governance and o f  Mozambican ownership and to  it an end 
should be put. (N ot an end to the system but to the non-disclosure and - ideally - from its 
separation from a less formal and probably less sophisticated Saude parallel ).
8. And also by systematic collection o f  micro information from observations and interviews, 
from the press and from micro studies (e.g. MSUs in tw o districts). These are not a 
substitute for Surveys and Sentinels (unless those do not exist) but do provide 
supplementary data and valuable quantitative insights. O f necessity much o f SDA's 
(especially the S SPA's) work was based on these.
9. An annual poverty report (especially on trends, shocks, policy and programmes instituted - 
continued-monitored (with results) is desirable for, a) Ministries, b) Local Government
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Iunits, c) Members o f  Parliament, d) Social Sector Organisations, e) donors/international 
agencies. (UNICEF now has a somewhat similar quarterly publication and could/would 
probably assist if UAP wanted to  set one up.) Parallel - every five years perhaps - should 
be a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (like the one UAP produced in 1995).
10. Revive w ork tow ard poverty impact assessment o f  programmes projects - initially by 
proposing Ministry, Province with review by UAP/DNP. A first step is to  consult to  draw 
up guidelines by sector o f  poverty impacts (positive and negative) to  look for including 
indirect impact (e.g. hire-purchase to rural transporters/crop buyers as means to  raise small 
farming household market access and incomes). Specific verbal and at least order o f  
magnitude quantitative estimates are needed. As a first step doing the exercise for Health 
plus W ater and W orks at Ministerial and Provincial level might be a way forward. 
Generalisation to other Ministries/Provincial Directorates could be launched by a "Poverty 
Impact Assessment Guidelines" manual and a 3 to 5 day workshop for Ministry and 
Provincial Planning/Project officers.
11. Maintain SDA's/UAP's reputation for being hard-headed (analysing carefully and knowing 
economics) as well as soft-hearted (genuinely wanting to reduce poverty/help poor people 
claw out o f  it). Maintaining analytical credibility and a reputation for knowing economics 
is necessary to  get and hold external financial source (and Mozambican Treasury) 
attention. In that respect SDA was at an advantage because SSPA was a senior applied 
macro economist and known to be relatively tough on evaluating benefit/cost and fiscal 
consequences. His use o f  - stress on - title SSPA was to  underline interaction o f  social 
with economic. Economic analysis needs rigour (logical, reasoned presentation), orders o f 
magnitude and approximate numbers where possible not elaborate technical models which 
M ozambique data won't support and aid administrators do not, in practice, understand or 
use.
The points made are processual more than topical or content oriented because the substantive 
topic areas were covered in the previous section. Process does matter because ideas unrelated 
to processes backed by procedures, personnel, publicity and resources are ultimately sterile. 
SDA/UAP have not been sterile but the degree o f  tentativeness o f  ad hoc lash-up job 
administration and process utilised and especially o f total dependence on a handful o f  
temporary o f  potentially temporary senior personnel was risky (even if largely unavoidable at 
least to  1993). Reducing risk to poverty reduction programming - because to  do so reduces 
risk to  poor people - should now be an UAP/DNP managerial Priority.
- R. H. Green 
Falmer
SDA. doc/rhg/sh/march96 February 1996
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A R u r a l  G APVU? ( N o t e s  b y  R. H. G r e e n )
1. This is not a new proposal - see Schuman's annex to his final GAPVU report (done in 
consultation with SSPA).
2. It poses problems:
a. in so far as GAPVU meets transitiona l poverty needs, a post Emergencia Provincial 
Calamities Commission drought relief programme is more appropriate in rural areas. 
The transitional component in rural absolute poverty is much higher than in urban. A 
"work for cash for food" (or soap or cloth) approach via labour intensive road- 
school-clinic-teach/nurse house construction and maintenance would be preferable to 
'free food' especially if  (as in Botswana) women heads o f household had priority for 
work (and churches/mosques/women's organisation were encouraged and assisted by 
SEAS in setting up village child care centres on the Tanzanian "Iringa" model on 
which studies are available from UNICEF).
b. for s truc tu ra l ru ra l poverty  (probably concentrated in female-headed households 
with too high a mouths to hands ratio) work programmes are less helpful because the 
household heads are working, do have some income, have no 'spare' time but income 
cannot meet needs. B u t a GAPVU - aged, disabled, low income female-headed model 
is likely to be adm in istratively  non-feasible. There is no analogue to Quarteiro level 
data/personnel base in villages or at least none with systematic upward data flows and 
the greater geographic areas involved militate against a direct application o f GAPVU 
referral, approval, monitoring procedures while the absence o f banks means payment 
through them is not feasible.
3. Frankly until Provincial Calamities Commissions and coordinating unit at centre are on top 
o f drought-flood response (including tying it to work for cash for food public works) I am 
not sure launching additional rural safety nets is unproblematic. However, if it is viewed 
as either appropriate (if only to gain experience) or socio-politically necessary, some pilots 
could be started.
4. A possible safety net p a tte rn  would be:
a. calam ity a llev ia tion /in frastructure  enhancem ent via works;
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b. " I r in g a "  style child nutrition/child  care centre/w om en's in itia tive programme 
coordinated by SEAS supported by UNICEF and operated by village level women's 
committees assisted by local level health, water and agriculture personnel. (Desirable 
in its own right not just as a safety net extension. Perhaps a pilot Province, e.g. Nyasa 
or Tete, all Districts, could be launched in 1997;
c. encourage local w om en's groups-churches-m osques to identify "structurally 
absolutely poor" member households and design low cost/local safety nets to be run by 
them with SEAS-UAP technical advice and SEAS (SAF-2) co-finance;
d. use the Centro de Saude system to identify women, children at risk (as for GAPVU) 
and  - subject to some check (by whom? no chefde carteiro and inherent problems 
with regulos in many districts. GAPVU many kilometres away in provincial capital -) - 
to pay a cash amount for 18 months (not necessarily at urban rate) via the posto or 
centro. This is not ideal because: a) Saude not paying agency o f choice; b) nowhere 
near 100% ante natal and well child clinic coverage in most rural areas (albeit chance 
o f cash would incentivate use especially by poor mothers with malnourished children); 
c) the ability to verify will be low (but as few Saude referrals are rejected this may 
matter less). A Pilot District approach with one District in each province set 
up/monitored by Provincial GAPVU/Saude/SEAS could be tried in 1997.
The risk o f  trying a-b-c and also d at once is overload in respect to personnel and also finance. 
It is essential that "a" be continued/improved and highly desirable "b" begin on a pilot basis in 
1997 while "c" is logical part o f cooperation with social sector/decentralisation themes in post 
1993 state strategy, "d" is the most problematic even if at first glance more appealing from a 
Maputo decision taker (or National Assembly?) perspective.
R. H. Green 
Sometime SSPA 
Falmer, February 1996
SDAl .doc/rhg sh/inarch96
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F o o d  S e c u r it y  A nd  T h e  M u e d a  Pl a t e a u : U r b a n  P h y s ic a l  S u p p l y  - R u r a l
In c o m e  E n t it l e m e n t s
(N o t e s  b y  R. H. G r e e n )
1. There are prior references to this issue in SSPA minutes. The main substance follows: It 
raises a number o f more general issues.
2. The M ueda Plateau is relatively fertile land with relatively assured rainfall. Therefore, like 
Angonia, it is a national breadbasket. It has been a grain exporting area since the 1950's 
and probably the 1930's. Pre independence production for sale was mixed - colon, African 
predominately the latter in 1960's-1970's. Grain purchase and return sale o f merchandise 
was by itinerantes - colon traders with a lorry who travelled out from warehouse/shop in 
Mueda, Moicimba or smaller towns to buy produce/sell goods. The main markets were 
Beira (and sometimes Maputo) by sea and Pemba (earlier by sea, later by road).
3. Moicimba was (is) the nearest port to the Plateau and was (is) connected to it by a good 
road. It has a fair harbour. The quay, however, is only able to handle 500 tonne (?) 
vessels. It is now used by the log trade. Grain (plus cement, fertiliser, general cargo) was 
lightered (flat bottom self propelled, snub nosed, shallow draught, open vessels like small 
barges) out to 1,000 to 1,500 tonne cabotage vessels.
4. The system was weakened before independence (the plateau was a war zone) and more so 
at independence (the itinerantes literally drove off into the sunset in their lorries leaving a 
very limited number of, largely Indian ancestry, merchants. Some o f cabotage vessels 
sailed off to the south, port maintenance declined). But the full breakdown comes at some 
time in 1983-1985 period:
a. lighters went out o f operation - engines worn out;
b. Navique's cabotage service became increasingly unreliable;
c. Road to Pemba was cut (near Pemba) isolating Plateau from bank credit (only 
branches able to authorise loans are in Pemba) and from govemment/empressa agents 
who sat in offices (or on beaches) in Pemba which over 1985-1991 was virtually an 
enclave accessible only by sea (or light plane which Provincial administration, let alone 
banks, did not use to maintain contact with Mueda).
5. Since 1989 I have tried to reinterest Ministries in Mueda. (Saude an honourable exception 
together with Agua - they kept postos/centros, some rural water projects going.) In one 
sense an 'easy' rural area once there - Renamo never had much o f a presence on plateau
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and never cut off link to Moicimba.) This had some impact e.g. first Agricultura national 
director visit in 4 years and came back enthusiastic, renewed EU visits. But transport 
problems because clear especially for commerce/small farming household market access.
6. There are three basic problems:
a. w orking capital (logically bank credit) to crop buyers (especially merchant 
transporters). At least at farm or village collection levels, Agricon cannot compete 
with goods out/produce back operators who are full both out and in and have two set 
o f business to earn margins whereas Agricon goes out empty and has only grain buying 
margins. Snags here are: a) Mueda, Moicimba have bank branches but so poorly 
staffed they are not allowed to make loans; b) BCM and BPD are so scared o f  more 
bad debts they are very hesitant about lending (no S-T branch even in Pemba);
b. lim ited lorries on Plateau or in Moicimba. Public and private sector fleets in Pemba 
but concentrate on Pemba/Plateau and Pemba/Nacala, Pemba/Nampula highways not 
Mueda/Moicimba let alone small road retail business. Merchants need to be able to get 
back out to villages. They physically lack lorries and, in most cases, cash or access to 
term credit to buy them. (The road is open and usable - not ideal condition.)
c. no functioning  p o rt at Moicimba. The lighters remain (at least until 1995) defunct. 
The quay is too shallow for economic size vessels for grain. The cabotage service o f  
1,000-1,500 class is also an historic memory (nearly inevitably with no lighters albeit 
whole coastal fleet is now too few).
7. As a result potential 50,000-75,000 tonne Plateau maize surplus rots in fields, moulds or 
feeds borer beetles in warehouses or is not planted while we beg for food aid for cities.
And small farming family sector (outside cashew areas) is deeply impoverished because it 
has no buyers for its potential maize surplus. And commercial sector not very dynamic (or 
large - new people don't come in) because low crop sales by households mean low sales to 
them by merchants and combined low turnover limits profits.
8. W hat is to be done? This case is one in which historic memory and analysis really do 
give a first draft for a prioritised action agenda which is - at the very least - a print out for
articulating a coordinated action programme.
a. reactivate M oicim ba. They key to that is lighters. I f  they are 10 tonne ones, for
100,000 to 150,000 tonnes cargo a year and 4 round trips a lighter a day need 13 to 15 
( 4 x 1 0  tonnes x 300 days = 12,000 tonnes a year per lighter). Those numbers need to 
be checked but there is a Small Ports Authority with a Portmaster on spot who can do 
it (should have done so long ago.) Similarly design and size need to be thought out
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(what Portuguese used in 1950's- 1970's may or may not be suitable vintage now).
With a clear set o f specifications some donor (Nordic? Canada? Netherlands?) should 
be convincible. Including some light cranes, warehouse repair, etc. the order to 
magnitude o f cost may be $2 million (could be less). If  cargo 100,000 tonnes could be 
port revenue on it o f $1 million plus a year.
9. Ensure cabotage service exists once port is able to handle it. From Berbera/Aden through 
M twara and from Durban through Walvis Bay there are viable cabotage operations which 
do serve minor ports. These range from modest size companies with 10 or so fairly 
modern 1,000 to 2,500 tonne vessels to old 500 to 1,000 tonne one vessel family 
enterprises. Basic cargoes - grain, charcoal, cement, drums o f fuel, roofing sheet, 
fertiliser, general consumer goods. All private (expect perhaps Safmarine in South Africa 
and a fairly small passenger oriented line Dar-Mafia-Kilwa-Lindi-Mtwara and a Zanzibar- 
Dar one). There was a Mozambique parallel. Today there is much less service and largely 
Maputo-Inhambane-Beira-Quelimane-Nacala-Pemba which are main and middle ports.
Ending Navique monopoly hasn't brought a wave o f new entrants - in many cases (e.g. 
Moicimba) because port facilities are inadequate and/or slow rehabilitation suggests there 
is little demand. However, also no hire purchase - term  credit - "leasing" facilities 
accessible to entrants. A small used but serviceable cabotage ship might cost $250,000 
and a larger new one $2.5 million. (I believe good condition used would be best entry 
route for small/medium enterprise. Source for Mombassa and Dar seems to be Europe. 
North Sea and Baltic coasters are designed for shallow water and bad weather so probably 
technically suitable and can sail out via Mediterranean.)
10. The next step - if this checklist proves broadly correct - is to see why no action (or not 
effective) to data and who needs to act, how. ((I've written above in varying degrees o f 
completeness in Minutes/Memos since 1990. Probably has bogged down - until end o f 
war for more urgent concerns and even now Mueda is a small and faraway place viewed 
from Maputo or even from Pemba and inertia is a terrible foe. For example, Agricon 
worries about how it could buy grain and cost o f  road transport via Pemba from monopoly 
buying and emergencia inward shipment days. Tunnel vision and an historic memory tied 
to a brief atypical period can be very debilitating!
11. Who can do what - and m ight wish to do so?
a. m erchan ts/transporters have interest in buying - moving grain if i)
economic/dependable transport; ii) business to be done; iii) hire purchase facilities to 
finance transport equipment and overdraft for purchasing/selling operations.
b. Small Ports A uthority  (unlike predecessor monolithic Railways and Harbours or even 
its Harbours Division which lived and died politically and economically on M aputo- 
Beira, could be helped or hurt by Nacala-Inhambane-Quelimane-Pemba and found 
minor ports an unrewarding headache) has good reason to wish to see Moicimba (and 
others, e.g. Xai Xai, Inharrime) thrive. They are its only business so it lives (or dies) 
on their success (or failure).
c. Provincial and  D istrict A dm inistrations (Pemba-Mueda-Moicimba) want 
prosperous (or at least less poor) people - genuine concern for people, ease o f  
administration, tax revenue, successes for their records to win promotion, etc. For the 
too Muedas matters.
d. M em bers o f Parliam ent from Mueda-Moicimba (and probably all from Cabo 
Delgado) care. Public service, helping own home village - extended family, winning 
next election, getting a fair share for their people (Cabo Delgado feels it led liberation 
from Massacre o f  Mueda on but has been marginalised in gains since independence 
which explains, otherwise surprisingly high, Renamo vote there). Their personal or 
party political concerns are not CNP's or UAP's business - their interest in making 
marketed output on plateau rise is very much UAP business because it makes them 
allies in struggle to reduce poverty. (Nobody involved in setting up GAPVU was 
thinking o f  elections. But with 70,000 households benefiting by then it probably was 
worth a seat or three! And why not - a government that serves its people better should 
earn reward o f more support. There is nothing wrong in pointing out to a M inister 
how a good programme will also be good for him politically! Or o f  warning o f  
political risks o f not acting or acting in an unsound way, e.g. at time o f  100% minibus 
fare increase I advised govt, under no circumstances to put itself in position o f  being 
responsible for fares or anger would turn on it then or later and also that costs o f  fuel 
and spares had risen massively over 18 months so rollback order would mean no 
vehicles on road. Also advised bottom line problem was wages. On the whole govt, 
response - a) halting violence, b) moral suasion for agreed partial, fare rollback; c) 
some minimum wages rises and a Christmas bonus was relevant and about the best:
for poor people, for keeping urban passenger transport going, and for its own political 
future that was possible in a tightly constrained context.)
e Provincial P lanning in DNP and D Planning in Cabo Delgado - PP needs more 
concrete projects with high visibility if successful to build up visibility and influence.
f. Those donors interested in leasing (USAID), financial sector diversification (EU), hire 
purchase (SIDA) who have studies to hand and are presumably interested in proposals 
on "how to" acceptable to govt. USAID seems to want a US leasing company with
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little southern experience, unclear what EU has done with its study (a Mike Faber- 
Jeanne Stephens-RHG product which did advocate hp to vehicles, plant and machinery 
and - 1 think - ships). SrDA has a Swedish company present in Mozambique as base 
with a Swedish financial firm as partner concept. What is needed is:
a. a com m ercial enterprise. Free standing or - perhaps - linked to a commercial 
enterprise selling vehicles, ships, plant and equipment;
b. p rivate  sector and  probably  100% foreign a t s ta r t - commitment to sell 49% to 
domestic buyers between 5 th and 10th year;
c. a finance house owned or partner to put in professional/hp experienced manager 
and to train (in Mozambique and at overseas headquarters) Mozambicans for most 
professional posts by year 5;
d. ideally a Southern  A frican financial en terprise with hp experience as partner 
(Standard Bank o f SA via Standard - Totta would be obvious candidate but S-T 
has been interviewed - e.g. by ADB - and were uninterested).
g. non-donor developm ent finance bodies - ADB has a mission on HP (wanted to use 
BPD but advised against by SSPA and the Emprego) and it is in CDC (Commonwealth 
Development Corporation) field. CDC could find the commercial operators and put 
up some equity plus some loan finance. ADB not optimal for finding operator - 
presumably would channel ADF (when it has some funds) credit to GOM to relend to 
enterprise.
h. A gricon (or successor) wants to be able to buy and ship grain and to make a profit on 
it o r (I hope!) to see private sector doing so. In fact many merchants appear to prefer 
to buy retail locally and sell wholesale to Agricon at Mueda-Moicimba-Pemba. That is 
fine (or should be) with Agricon which has comparative advantage in knowing/linking 
to Nacala or Beira or Inhambane or Maputo market (Pemba and Quelimane could 
under all normal conditions be served from adjacent Districts) and no disadvantage in 
hiring cabotage space or chartering coaster to move wholesale shipment. More 
retailers to feed into it at wholesale is fine - for Agricon retail buying always likely to 
be a tin o f scorpions.
i. W orld B ank if only because it feels it is godfather and protector to UAP and really 
does believe in PPP and has some desire to see growth - private sector- pure 
households livelihood links build up. Can be enemy if not in picture and useful pusher 
o f  bilaterals if brought on board.
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12. UAP - since there is a poor Mueda Plateau household and a food security basis - has locus 
standi to be a catalyst. Next step is for UAP to plan what to do (including seeing 
everybody noted in 11 and seeking to get them on board) after securing approval at ND - 
and probably VM, perhaps M - level. Then organise coalition and get agreement who co­
ordinates/pushes ahead. Or who on what - Small Ports could lead on harbour but 
somebody in finance or DNP (including UAP) has to hunt down issues on ships-lorries-hp.
13. Good luck!
- R. H. Green 
Sometime SSPA 
Falmer March 1996
P.S. It may be worth checking whether any other surplus/potential surplus district have 
similar problems. Likely ones are upcountry district in Zambesia (e.g. Macuba) 
Northeast Tete (e.g. Angonia), perhaps lakeside Nyasa (e.g. Lichinga). These are all 
basically road haul areas so private sector may be able to act on own (Quelimane 
Harbour functions) but credit for buyers and hp for lorries may be relevant for some 
o f them too. A fax backed by phone call to Provincial Planning Directors and District 
Governors would seem easiest way to get an initial local input and a look at Agricon's 
and Commerce's purchase figures (estimates) by District a potentially revealing desk 
check start in Maputo.
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